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1 Preface
This is a preliminary note of some numerical experiments; the results may
be rather wrong.
2 Introduction
This paper presents the results of numerical experiments to determine the
probability, over concrete fixed finite fields, of prime-order elliptic curves having
a prime-order twist.
These curves are called “elliptic twins” by [7], and are useful for a variety of
cryptographic applications.1
Most notable is that such curves are secure against an “insecure twist” at-
tack. This attack was introduced in 2001 by Daniel Bernstein, see [2], who has
proposed “twist-security” (a slightly weaker condition) as an essential safety
criterion for elliptic curves. [1]2
The most interesting result of this paper is that, for the finite fields the
NSA-generated curves are defined over, there is only an approximately 1/100
probability of a random prime-order curve having a prime-order twist.
P-384 was standardized by NIST in 1999, and generated by the NSA at some
previous time.[9] It has a prime-order twist. [2]
P-224 was standardized by NIST at the same time. It does not have a
prime-order twist. In fact, its twist has only 58-bit security. 3
1[7] only consider the asymptotic density of “elliptic twins” as a fraction of all elliptic curves,
so their results only partially address the question of this paper. One analytic approach might
be to combine their results with the results of [GalbraithMcKee].
2[1] autocites Burton Kaliski ([5]) as introducing the so-called “unsafe-twist” attack, but
I have been unable to find any evidence either in that paper or Kaliski’s thesis, [4], that he
was aware of the attack. Kaliski’s construction of an elliptic-curve-and-twist-based random
number generator does, however, require that discrete log be hard on both the curve and its
twist, as he explicitly notes.
3The twist of P-224 has a cofactor of 32 · 11 · 47 · 3015283 · 40375823 · 267983539294927. [2]
1
3 Elliptic twin curves
We follow the definitions of [7], with some minor modifications.
Let Ej be the elliptic curve of invariant j, and Ej(Fq) be its reduction over
a finite field of characteristic p > 5, n ≥ 1 with p prime. Let and t(Ej(Fq)) be
the trace of Frobenius of that elliptic curve.
Let E˜j(Fq) be the non-trivial quadratic twist of Ej(Fq) over the same field.
An elliptic twin is a pair consisting of a prime p, and a set of two primes not
equal to p or 0, {l, r}, such that
#Ej(Fp) + #E˜j(Fp) = l + r = 2p+ 2− l + r (1)
[7] provide evidence that elliptic twins exist over arbitrary prime fields, but
the formulae of [7] do not appear to provide precise estimates for fixed finite
fields.
4 Primes
We consider the non-Mersenne SECP primes, standardized for the use of the
federal government in [9], which are, where N := 232:
P224 = N
7 −N3 +N0
P256 = N
8 −N7 +N6 +N3 −N0
P384 = N
12 −N4 −N3 +N1 −N0
(2)
They are subset of the class of Generalized Mersennes defined by [8].
5 Numerical methods
5.1 Finding prime-order curves
Method 1. A slightly modified version of PARI/GP was used to calculate
the traces of prime-order curves, based on code of [HamburgPARI]. (The
particular code used for this version of this paper may be found at [6].) Point-
counting was aborted early if #Ej was found to have a small prime factor. This
computation produced estimates for the density both of prime-order curves and
elliptic twin curves over each field.
Method 2. For P-384, a slightly larger computation was carried out using
the same code, but set up to abort point-counting if either #Ejor#E
t
j(Zq)) had
a small prime factor. The experiment
2
5.2 Results
Experiment 1. We calculate Tf (j) for each Ej for 0 < j < 2
20, j 6= 1728,
then test #Ej and #E
t
j(Zq)) for primality.
For this to be a reasonable procedure, it requires the assumption that j-
invariant is not correlated with the probability of the curve being an elliptic
twin, even on a local scale of 220.
Let Npi be the number of prime-order curves found, and Npi′ be the number
of elliptic twins found. Then, in this range, we have:
Npi Npi′ Npi′/Npi
P224 2790 31 1.1e-2
P256 1956 15 0.8e-2
P384 1131 20 1.8e-2
Experiment 2. Because of the small number of elliptic twin curves found
in expriment 1, we planned to conduct the following experiment: For 1000
pseudorandomly-generated j-invariants, set ji,0 to a j-invariant, and increment
until ji,n is an elliptic twin. The average of ji,n is then an estimator for 1/p(pi
′).
Due to resource constraints this experiment was aborted after finding only
441 elliptic twins.
Combining these results with those of experiment 1, after bootstrapping,
give a 99% confidence interval for p(pi′|pi) = [0.005, 0.01].
6 Future work
In future work, we plan to extend the study to consider the more general
question of the distribution of group structure and curve exponent for reductions
of curves over fields for which their number of integral points is non-prime, and
apply similar techniques with respect to the two curves proposed for IETF
use, the nearly-Mersenne M255 = 2
255 − 19 and the Hamburg-Solinas trinomial
H448 = 2
448 − 2224 − 1. 4
(We probably won’t extend this work to the Mersenne M521, as that partic-
ular calculation is pestiferously large.)
7 Conclusion
The quantity 1/p(p) = Npi(p)/Npi′(p) is an estimator for the number of trials
required, when choosing a prime curve uniformly at random in Fq for that curve
to be an elliptic twin.
The probability, however, that no elliptic curves in a set of N curves are
elliptic twins is, of course,
1− (
∏
0≤i<n
(1− pi)) (3)
4The Hamburg primes are “Karatsuba-friendly” and [3] was the first to publish an algo-
rithm that fully takes advantage of their special form.
3
With respect to the curves generated by the NSA for [SECP1], and subse-
quently standardized by [9], this calculation gives a probability of very approx-
imately > 95% that none of the curves over P224,P256, and P384 would be an
elliptic twin.
But the curve over P-384 is an elliptic twin.
One might thus conclude that it is more likely than not that the NSA’s curves
were not generated by a process that samples from a uniform distribution on
prime-order curves over the chosen prime fields.5
In particular, this suggests that the NSA’s choice of seeds for the “random”
prime curves were subject to additional safety criteria not yet publicly disclosed.
(Or, of course, that things with 5% probability aren’t terribly rare events...6)
In addition, it suggests that the fever for “twist-security” which has taken
grip of the cryptographic community is potentially dangerous: These are a
smallish class of elliptic curves, and there is no evidence that – provided an
implementation is not vulnerable to a small-twist attack – they possess either
more or less structure than a non-twist-secure curve.
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Appendix. Cofactors for SafeCurves
This table is adapted (read stolen directly) from [2]. The rows have been
sorted by the cofactor of the twist of the curve. The curves for which twist-
security was a stated security criterion during the selection process have been
omitted.
Curve h(Ej) h(E
t
j(Zq)))
secp384r1 1 1
secp256r1 1 3·5·13·179
secp256k1 1 32·132·3319·22639
FRP256v1 1 7·439·11760675247·3617872258517821
secp224r1 1 32·11·47·3015283·40375823·267983539294927
brainpoolP256 1 52·175939·492167257·8062915307·2590895598527·4233394996199
brainpoolP384 1 7·112·241·5557·125972502705620325124785968921221517
5 Why, then, don’t all of P224 , P256 , and P384 have safe twists? Note that the probability
of that would be
∏
0≤i<n(1− pi), or less than 1.5e− 6, or a roughly 1 in 630,000 chance.
6In partial defense of the NSA: Suppose that it did, in fact, draw the seeds for the SECP
prime curves uniformly at random until it found prime order curves. There is no good way of
the NSA “proving” that it followed this procedure honestly, even if it did. This reinforces the
importance of some “rigidity” criterion, as per [NUMS].
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